What changes when the LLM judge and the System One model are switched on.
The Cisco AI Defense skill scanner has three stages that can look at a skill: a set of deterministic rules, a System One model, and a full LLM judge. Only the rules had been measured. This is what happens when the other two are switched on, measured on the same corpora and with the same code that produced the published rule-only numbers.
Every usable skill in the gitskills corpus, 1,876,662 of them, was scanned by every deterministic analyzer and read by the LLM judge and the System One model served on local GPUs. The deterministic rules were then tuned from those results, checked on every labelled corpus, and the whole corpus rescanned with the final tree. The large-scale page has the detail.
--system-one-endpoint tier is advisory only; asked eight choice questions, OpenJev
screens well in front of the judge, as the large-scale page shows.A skill is an unusually open format. It can contain any code, in any language, for any legitimate reason, so most of what a rule matches on is ordinary software. That makes precision hard to hold and makes it tempting to assume an LLM reviewing the output would mostly add noise. On the development split, where rule precision was already 99%, that assumption looked safe. It turned out to be wrong on the harder test split, where the rules were missing far more than they were over-flagging.
Detection is the share of skills in that group that got flagged at all. Hover any column name for its definition.
| Corpus | Population | Rules | System One model | Judge |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| HarmfulSkillBench | 200 skills | 4.00% | 26.13% | 56.00% |
| MaliciousSkillBench balanced subset | 400 malicious, 400 benign | 33.00% | 54.31% | 81.75% |
| OpenSkillRisk: contextually risky | 214 skills | 32.71% | 11.00% | 77.10% |
| OpenSkillRisk: obviously malicious | 160 skills | 30.00% | 95.77% | 100.00% |
What is good: Both models beat the rules everywhere except one place, and the judge beats everything everywhere. On the obviously-malicious half of OpenSkillRisk the judge caught all of it.
What is not: The System One model is much worse than the rules on contextually risky skills, catching 11% against the rules' 33%. It is a confident filter for clear cases, not a substitute for judgement on ambiguous ones.
Source figures for the rule-only baseline: https://huggingface.co/blog/Vineethsain/tuning-cisco-skill-scanner. Earlier work on System One models: https://huggingface.co/spaces/Vineethsain/defenseclaw-system-one.